year to found a highly successful technology company that commercialized research he had developed while on the faculty. In addition to running the university, he now finds time to sit on the board of directors of Google and Cisco. Stanford not only aggressively encourages this kind of entrepreneurial effort, it provides significant resources to the surrounding Silicon Valley, including the development of a large industrial park that is now home to Facebook, Hewlett Packard, and numerous law firms, investment firms, and other players in the Valley's success.
But this example tugs at the heart of Mirowski's narrative. Stanford is home as well to a major center of neo-liberal thought, the Hoover Institution, where Milton Friedman spent the latter period of his career. Yet far from a decoupling of the university from the private sector that Mirowski contends is the goal of the neo-liberal agenda, we find a particularly deep-seated partnership between the market and the academy. This partnership stretches back well into the Golden Age when, some have argued, it was really Stanford's role to bring many private sector players to the table with figures from the Department of Defense in order to shape jointly the direction of Cold War science and strategy.
And does Mirowski believe that scientists were ever as naïve about either power or money in American society as he portrays Viridiana Jones to be? Was there an era in which the relationship between the intellectual and surrounding society was not deeply problematic? Certainly the Cold War era was not free of such conflict. In fact, one could argue that the field of science studies itself owes something to efforts like the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964 to recast our understanding of the modern university. The FSM was in part a reaction to the worldview of Clark Kerr, the president of the University of California from 1958 to 1967, and a leading architect of the modern higher education system. As early as 1963 Kerr, certainly no neo-liberal, coined the term ''multiversity'' and noted in The Uses of the University (Harvard 1963) that ''the university and segments of industry are becoming more alike. As the university becomes tied into the world of work, the professor-at least in the natural and in some of the social sciences-takes on the characteristics of an entrepreneur'' (p. 90). Kerr's work sparked a response from two key figures at Berkeley, Hal Draper and Mario Savio. Draper's widely circulated essay ''The Mind of Clark Kerr'' would savage Kerr, noting the irony of promoting the integration of the university with the wider world yet limiting the ability of students to engage in campus political organizing. Savio, in turn, used Draper's work as intellectual capital to give birth to a new era of critical thinking about the university and society.
While I question here the periodization that Mirowski relies upon, nonetheless, in doing so, he provides a powerful and compelling narrative of important trends in the world of science, the university and the wider economy. The book will be of significant value to scholars across numerous disciplines as the institution that sustains them weathers the important changes now underway. 
SAMANTHA MACBRIDE
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We all know that citizens and governments of the North are failing to respond to climate change. Year in, year out, Conferences of the Parties fail to yield consensus or concrete plans to curtail developed nations' disproportionate contributions to global warming. In the United States, denial of climate change remains a rhetorically ''scientific'' position of dissent. Failure to act on materially meaningful policy is seen across the board: in no country have consumption or emissions leveled off. Nations that do implement emissions reduction policies at the national level import resources and energy from nations that do not, displacing effects. The displacement of effects is in fact a rampant and endemic feature of globalization. Direct, secondary and tertiary outcomes of climate change are now crashing, flooding, and generating scarcity among the most vulnerable people of the
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Contemporary Sociology 41, 2 world. We have all heard this, we all know it, including those of us who are sociologists. Yet we, sociologists, at times do not want to talk about the subject because it is too overwhelming. We, sociologists, are not really sure about what to do, and we manage to live most of our days comfortably, despite the knowledge that climate change is here and going to get much, much worse. Kari Norgaard's book helps us to understand this condition, and as such makes a huge contribution not only to sociology, but to the collective and urgent challenge that everybody faces today.
Norgaard conducts deep and extensive ethnography among a population in Norway, and on the one hand, is confronted with stark, first-hand evidence of climate change in the marked loss of snow-cover and unseasonal growth of plant species; and on the other, comes from a culture that not only prides itself on thrift and progressive policy, but gave birth to, among other things, the Deep Ecology movement. If one would expect political talk and action in response to global warming anywhere, her choice of study site implies, it would be in Norway. What she finds instead is widespread denial, operating at various levels of consciousness, and articulated in ways that are rich in social significance. As a warm winter with delayed snowfall cuts into cherished traditions of skiing and ice-fishing, threatening the local tourist economy, residents react, if at all, with good-natured resignation or, in a few instances, by producing snow artificially. Absent are expressions of political concern such as protest, electoral pressure, local planning, or general critical dialog in public and private settings.
Norgaard spent a year living in a small town in the mountains of Western Norway in the early 2000s. Involving herself in political groups, voluntary associations, street protest, and social life, she studied the relatively rare instances in which the topic of climate change came up in conversation, noting the emotional and cognitive orientations of speakers in a range of institutional settings. She also conducted a meticulous review of local media content on the subject, and interviewed close to 50 residents. These observations come together in a thick qualitative data set that Norgaard uses to develop a model of socially organized denial.
As Norgaard explains, she wants to understand both how and why the denial of risks, importance, and need for collective action on global warming takes place. Studying the fleeting moments in which people talk about climate change seriously, Norgaard identifies four core reactions: fear, guilt, helplessness, and crisis of identity. These reactions lend themselves to silent endurance, cultivated distraction, or disassociation via humor or hyper-facticity, because, she argues, the practical organization of the lived social process provides them no alternate purchase. This organization, the social construction of attention and ''the normal'' that scholars such as Zerubavel have written about, involves two experiential scales: community, and nationhood. Among family, friends, co-workers and even political associates, norms of stoicism, optimism, and conformity squelch expressions of not knowing what to do, and being scared about it. On another level, the narrative of historic, mythic, ''little'' Norway, where simple folks live traditionally with nature, is discursively mobilized to minimize the country's significant contribution to climate change, assuaging culpability and reinforcing cultural identity.
These are the hows of denial, mechanisms that Norgaard painstakingly teases apart to describe, and then skillfully synthesizes across empirical contexts. The whys of denial involve hegemony as Gramsci described it, and have to do with the power of those who stand to benefit from keeping political talk among potential dissenters quiet. In this case, the powerful are fossil-fuel and energy-producing sectors, and a state that protects them from national and multilateral regulation. Norgaard discusses Norway's retreat from a position of environmental leadership in national energy policy in the late 1980's, and its turn toward oil development and the internationalization of the climate change issue in the decades that followed. Somewhere between these macroscale developments and the daily, negotiated practices of discussing and not discussing climate change, hegemonic forces are at work. Here is where Norgaard's otherwise thorough analysis leaves the reader slightly wanting. Although national-scale policy development and intimate communicative practice have clearly proceeded apace in Norway (and in the counter example of the United States, to which she devotes a chapter), I found myself wanting to know more about the mechanisms of translation from the former sphere to the latter.
Such questions are exceedingly difficult to address, and the importance of Norgaard's work is not seriously diminished by not attending to them. The value of her research is, as she points out, to understand widespread denial of a social fact without historical precedent: the once-preventable, now inevitable anthropogenic alteration of the climate, and consequently the balance of life. Her choice to study denial among the extraordinarily privileged is, as she notes, both strategically urgent and also highly relevant to the understanding of environmental injustice. And perhaps her compassionate, complex, and The reader learns from the preface that the book is one in a series edited by the author entitled, ''Advancing the Sociological Imagination.'' One gathers that Bernard Phillips heads a sort of Mills sect, complete with a manifesto and a web page detailing the history of the group, a biography of Mills, and a ''guide to personal evolution.'' This is all rather unusual, but I am sure the author would have it no other way. Moving reception of Mills firmly into the 1970s, the author takes the charge in The Sociological Imagination to link ''the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self'' (Mills 2000:7) to suggest a therapeutic course in which one unlearns the ''stratified or bureaucratic worldview'' that generates ''increasing personal and social problems'' and replaces it with an ''interactive or evolutionary scientific method'' that will yield ''decreasing personal and social problems' ' (pp. 16-17) . In short, I'm not OK, you're not OK, and the world is certainly not OK, largely for the reasons Mills outlined fifty-odd years ago. Unless the vision of the scientific method developed in the book is adopted, Armageddon awaits.
The core argument can be summarized succinctly: Developments of the last few centuries have generated a growing gap between aspirations and fulfillment. This gap is rooted in a ''stratified or bureaucratic worldview.'' It produces a host of new wants, but yields a science, reflective of that worldview, that is incapable of satisfying them and generates an array of ever more threatening externalities. The question thus becomes, ''how can we learn to use a broad approach to the scientific method in our everyday lives as a basis for altering our worldview, closing our aspirations-fulfillment gap, and solving personal and social problems'' (p. 53)? Sociology holds the key, but sociology, too, is plagued by a stratified or bureaucratic worldview. C. Wright Mills offered a solution. It lies in application of the ''sociological imagination. '' Having developed his thesis, Phillips draws on The Wizard of Oz for inspiration, using the Tin Man (heart), Scarecrow (head), and Cowardly Lion (hand) as organizing ideas for the body of the book. ''Heart'' involves a commitment to addressing a problem, ''head'' refers to the scientific concepts necessary for understanding that problem, and ''hand'' represents the scientific or technical solution to the problem. Three
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